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'Peoples Wars' after the International Military Tribunals: An Inquiry into a Global Dimension of the Civilizing Process

(Original Title: The International Military Tribunals and a New Phase in the Civilizing Process: An Inquiry into Organized Violence in an Age of Globalization)

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> Perhaps it has not yet been stated clearly enough that human rights include the right of freedom from the use of physical force or even the threat of physical force, and the right to decline to use or threaten to force in the service of anther. The right to freedom for one's person or one's family from the use or threat of violence shows once again that the transition to a new position of the individual *vis-à-vis* his or her society. (Elias 1991: 233)

The theme of my current research is the relationship between 'globalization' and violence. In this paper, I use Norbert Elias' theory of 'civilizing process' to analyze 'peoples' wars,' a type of organized violence after World War II.

From the standpoint of 'civilizing process,' the regulation of violence has been related with the creation of outsiders. Absolutist states could suspend threats of violence by creating domestic outsiders, dividing them from established 'courtly-men.' Nation-states, or 'civilized nations,' had a similar mechanism for controlling violence. One major difference, however, was the creation of external outsiders, dividing 'civilized nations' from 'savages.' In this process, the responsibility for violence in civilized nations was individualized and criminalized, and external organized violence was sacralized. The national 'civilizing process,' however, generated a new problem: the use of organized violence outside the framework of civilized nations. At the national level, the civilizing process brought stability in civilized nations, but created instability between civilized nations and developing societies, and between civilized nations. This is the problem of the global 'civilizing process.'

To discuss the global civilizing process, I consider the International Military Tribunals after World War II, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. As the first war crimes trials, they opened up the possibility of imposing more rigorous 'rules of law' on international organized violence. In particular, the Tokyo Tribunal tried to apply a method similar to the national civilizing process. We can see how national violence was individualized and centralized in the tribunal: state responsibility for organized violence was attributed to specific individuals, and a 'civilized world' that held a monopoly on 'intervention' was created (See Figure 2). International violence for 'expansion of borders' was criminalized. This was the dawn of a global civilizing process.



Figure1 National Civilizing Process and Violence



Figure2 The dawn of a Global Civilizing Process

Organized violence, however, did not disappear after WWII. New types of organized violence emerged: 'peoples' wars' and 'quasi-intervention.' These kinds of violence were related with the Tokyo Tribunal. The Tribunal generated the possibility that colonial populations could become self-determining. The establishment of the United Nations and the promotion of human rights

accelerated the trend. Through the formal recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination, forcible nation-building (e.g. "development-dictatorships,") and a new type of organized violence for 'border demarcation,' a kind of peoples' war, was generated. The reason is that, although in the past civilized nations could employ the method of creating external outsiders for nation-building, for instance, through colonization, developing countries could not imitate this nation-building. Instead, they created internal outsiders by differentiating between 'peoples.' They built up 'the people' as a substantive category, by creating "enemies of the people." The United Nations unintentionally backed up development-dictatorships and peoples' wars, because of its nation-state-based form of participation. The United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and their allies supported development-dictatorships and peoples' wars. Indirectly, the adversarial relationship of the Cold War, a reciprocal creation of external outsiders, facilitated the production of 'enemies of the people' in developing countries, for example, in the case of the president Ngo Dinh Diem and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Directly, the superpowers supported or opposed development-dictatorships by their 'quasi-intervention,' as in the Vietnam War.

From around the end of the Cold War, peoples' wars changed. We witnessed the emergence of peoples' wars that created external outsiders.

For developing countries, the end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of external outsiders that had supported their creation of domestic outsiders. It revealed the vulnerability and inflexibility of the concept 'peoples.' One problem was that 'peoples' are not monolithic entities in the first place, and colonial experiences confused the relations. In addition, developing countries came under strain, because their nation-building depended on the creation of domestic outsiders. Another problem was that development-dictatorships enhanced their legitimacy by not only creating 'enemies of the people' but also by promoting economic development of the 'people.' This resulted in the birth of pro-democracy movements, especially among the elite. Third, democratization attracted investment from advanced countries. The rapid progress of liberalization of financial markets, capital markets, and trade, at that moment in time, did not expand development everywhere. Even if it brought growth, the benefits were not distributed fairly.

U.S. 'unilateralism' was deeply related with these globalizing tendencies. In the 80s and after, the U.S. cemented her relationships with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, whose institutional frameworks are different from the U.N. Building relations with developing countries through capital mobility allowed the U.S. to escape from the 'multilateralism' of the U.N. (See Figure 4) Parallel with this, domestic policy also shifted from Keynesian and social-democratic policies to neo-liberal, anti-welfare state policies. The U.S. came to be the only superpower in the post-Cold War era through the absence of rivals and this new style of relationships with developing countries.

New types of violence emerged with this change. In developing countries, in addition to peoples' wars that aimed at nation-building, competitive peoples' wars aiming at the collapse of administration and the fragmentation of the 'people' could well come into being. These reciprocal armed conflicts tend to escalate, and the spread of these new types of war could go global in tandem with economical globalization and the advancement of information technology. Examples are 'internal wars' and 'ethnic conflicts' in Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia, and 9.11. These peoples' wars are characterized by 'border clashes' through the creation of external outsiders. The 'intervention' by the U.S. also changed. It went beyond 'quasi-intervention' in the name of the 'civilized world' and became military campaigns in the name of 'security of nations (peoples)' at home, ‘American people’, and in developing countries, e.g. ‘Iraqi people’.



Figure 3 Cold War era "peoples' wars"

Figure 4 Post-Cold War era "peoples' wars"

Conclusion

In the past civilized nations could discharge the tension between state-building and nation-building through the violent creation of external outsiders. Developing countries after WWII could not intimate this, but could create internal outsiders. The post WWII world had regulated international wars by supporting organized violence and confining it to developing countries. After the end of the cold war, such confinement became impossible. 'Global terror networks' represent this new reality. Now, U.S. unilateralism brings developing countries to account for the overflow of violence, and U.N. and E.U. multilateralism help developing countries to overcome violence. They are similar in that they both require *developing countries* to regulate violence. It may be too much to demand that they build up well-established nations without using the easiest form of nation-building, the violent creation of outsiders. It is a kind of 'double bind.' Of course, creating outsiders by violence cannot be allowed in our time. Nonetheless, advanced countries that had a position of advantage in the past should understand at least the difficulty of nation-building today. The problem is not only a problem of developing countries but also other parts of the world, international organizations, countries, NGOs, and *individuals*. All of us should try to find a way to regulate organized violence without the creation of outsiders. This is a new problem of order and frontier for sociology.

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